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By Scott Burnham 
For many years, the history of music theory seemed most useful as a 
source for dissertation topics, the models of choice being the critically 
annotated translation of some little-read treatise, "book report"-style cov-
erage of a wider range of a theorist's work, or sometimes the tracing of a 
concept or category through several generations of theorists (sonata form, 
or the 2 chord). The unstated assumption that there would be little over-
whelming relevance in such topics guaranteed their suitability as journey-
man demonstrations of scholarly aptitude. Students could safely work in 
distant tributaries, away from the roaring cataracts of central issues. Intel-
lectual investment would be limited to showing a consciousness of the 
relationship of such tributaries to the main stream, either by locating 
originary traces of modern theories or by indulging in the compensatory 
satisfaction of being able to appraise earlier theories as primitive and 
unenlightened. But as more and more theorists have been brought to 
light in this manner and the list of critical editions grows, there is an 
equally growing apprehension that the history of our theoretical assump-
tions has moved closer to the center of our concerns in musicology. For as 
we become increasingly self-aware of the ways we talk about music, as talk 
about music eclipses music itself as the most fascinating object in the 
academic firmament, the history of such talk suddenly assumes a luminous 
relevance. 
If music claims any place at all in academic discourse, it is as a cipher 
whose history is one of ever changing investiture. The study of the history 
of music theory enjoys the closest view of the parade route of authorities 
that have been vested in music and allows for an examination of the 
intellectual and ethical motivations behind them. Nature, Reason, Physiol-
ogy, Psychology, Theology, and Human Cognition stand among these au-
thorities, each variously appealed to in various ages. Music is alternately a 
force of nature, a product of reason, or an expression of the transcendent; 
it is a human practice, a product of cognition, and an expression of the 
creative psyche. What remains throughout any combination of these attri-
butions is the invariably unshakable yet variably supportable belief that 
music is of fundamental importance to the human condition, and the 
history of its theory is largely the history of underwriting this belief in 
music's value through analogies with other currently meaningful human 
activities. We clearly feel the substantiality of music and yet, like Chamisso's 
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Peter Schlemihl, it casts no shadow. As a hedge against the abiding fear 
that music has no communicable meaning that can be the subject of 
reasoned discourse (and consequently the fear that it may in fact have no 
"real" importance), music theory strives to give music back its shadow. l 
Highly valued but equivocally grounded, music becomes a magical pres-
ence inviting both awe and anxiety.2 As a natural response to this view of 
music, music theorists have sought time and again (with all the earnest 
demeanor of blind, or perhaps bad, faith) to attach musical practice to 
esteemed cultural ideals: the agenda behind the construction of a music 
theory is very often one of fitting an existing practice to some sort of 
idealized intellectual model. This is increasingly found to be the case in 
medieval and renaissance theories, which up until recently have been 
examined primarily for clues about performance practices. Accounts of 
practice in the treatises of those periods reveal puzzling anomalies when 
attempts are made to reconstruct the moribund traditions they presum-
ably expound.3 For music theory is never purely an act of codification, as it 
is sometimes portrayed (Fux as the codification of Palestrina, or, closer to 
home, A. B. Marx as the codification of Beethoven); mixed with the urge 
to account for what is vital in any given composer or style is the urge to 
idealize musical practice in ways congruent with one's world view. 
In fact, the perception of just what is vital in a musical practice is often 
dictated by what is vital to one's value system (that which appears to be 
alive in one's necessarily selective field of vision). To take but one ex-
ample, J. P. Rameau's entire theoretical oeuvre hums with the tension 
between empirical practice and the assumption of Cartesian ideals; vital to 
Rameau in the burgeoning tonal practice of his age is the susceptibility of 
harmonic syntax to generalization. He noticed that a pervasive aspect of 
musical practice, the dominant-tonic cadence, could act as a model for all 
other harmonic progressions and as a music~l/ empirical representation 
of the nature of pitch itself (the fifth returning to its source), thus allow-
ing the semblance of a deductive system.4 An element of practice and an 
intellectual model attract each other, and an inevitable host of adjust-
ments are made to preserve the marriage. 
This continued tension between musical practice and intellectual model 
claims central importance in the history of music theory. Equal consider-
ation to both factors is rarely granted in studies of the history of theory: 
either an earlier theorist's effectiveness in accounting for a particular mu-
sical practice is gauged by the nearest available lights, namely the per-
ceived effectiveness of one's own theory, or the nature of his theory is 
explained primarily as a result of intellectual influences. These latter ex-
planations are often based on similarities in language between a theorist 
and some philosopher, for example. Once such similarities are detected, 
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the works of the theorist in question are then ransacked for other such 
evidence, and an interpretation based on influence arises. This kind of 
interpretation is then employed either to explain what is inadequate about 
a theorist (as in interpretations of A. B. Marx as a contradictory mix of 
Hegel and Goethe) or to show how a favored theorist is- grounded in a 
venerable philosophical tradition (as in depictions of Schenker as Goethean 
or Kantian). 5 Academically feasible evidence is found for pre-existing value 
judgments. 
One way to avoid a premature or prejudicial assessment of influence as 
well as to keep in one's sights the mutually interactive confluence of praxis 
codification and intellectual model is to investigate first and foremost what 
a theorist in fact does rather than what he says he is doing or what one wishes 
he had done. The surest way to determine what a theorist does is to 
determine how he engages musical practice-what kinds of things are 
ascribed to that practice? how is the practice conceptualized?6 Only after a 
theorist's intellectual engagement with practice is understood in some 
internally logical way can that theorist's work stand open for an investiga-
tion of influence. As Allan Keiler puts it, in a discussion of philosophical 
influence on the different stages of Schenker's theory: "the whole question 
of influence can be confronted squarely only when each stage is under-
stood synchronically in some coherent (or not coherent) way and when a 
comprehensible internal logic of development of such stages points the way 
to just those problematic areas whose understanding can come only from 
the outside."7 In short, to echo Roman Jakobson (and Saussure before 
him), you have to know what the points are before you can draw lines 
between them. 
An understanding of synchronic "internal logic" in a theorist's work is 
facilitated when the music under examination is still part of a viable tradi-
tion. The history of tonal theory is thus of particular interest to us today, 
for its object of study is a music not only with which we are abundantly 
familiar, but which continues to bear the main argument of musical tradi-
tion in the modern West. Our study of the history of this music's theory is 
not directed toward reconstructing an unavailable musical experience, as 
has been the case with some branches of early-music history of theory (the 
efficacy of which is questioned above). We can instead approach earlier 
tonal theorists with our own internalized assumptions about the music 
they are attempting to understand-we are thus in a better position to 
gauge the shape of their endeavors, for we have the shape of our own as a 
ready comparison. 
Of course this reliance on a shared tradition as rapprochement will easily 
lead to unproductive assessments of earlier theorists if the shape of our 
own concerns is treated as the desired standard against which earlier work 
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is measured. There is no surer way to guarantee a complete misunder-
standing of a theorist working from another standpoint than to measure it 
against one's own in this way. The model for this procedure is of course 
the now outmoded essentialist view of the history of science: the shared 
tradition of music is treated like a product of the natural world, the under-
standing of which is increasingly refined by subsequent generations of 
scientist-theorists. Thus we read about what Rameau got right (inversion 
theory) and what he got wrong (suspensions); or what Riemann got right 
(harmonic function), and what he didn't (dualism). 
We need to be more concerned with understanding the history of mu-
sic theory as an intellectual and cultural history than with constructing the 
pre-history of today's theory. This shift in emphasis would involve treating 
all theories as systems of thought with their own integrity and as cultural! 
historical products with their own ways and means. Our present theoreti-
cal prejudices can start a dialogue with the earlier theory, in the manner 
of a hermeneutic exchange. Such an exchange would take the shape of a 
questioning, starting (most profitably, according to Thomas Kuhn) with 
those aspects of the earlier theory which seem to stand in greatest contra-
diction to our own views.8 The hermeneutic exercise then involves arriving 
at an understanding of the other theory that makes any apparently refrac-
tory aspects necessary, or at least relevant, to that theory. We thus move 
away from ''why does Riemann insist on dualism?" as a rhetorical question 
along the lines of "why does he continue to bet on a lame horse (when he 
has a stable of winners)?" to "why does Riemann need dualism?" as a real 
question with the possibility of a revealing answer. Our question would 
then take the form of "why does his horse seem lame to us and a winner to 
him?" leading to "on what kind of race track would such a horse prove a 
winner?"9 Every test of an earlier theorist's assumptions is thus at the same 
time a test of our own assumptions. The result would be a more integrated 
view of ourselves as historical beings: instead of living within a discon-
nected present in need of a constitutive past we would be part of a present 
vitally connected to the past. Our own assumptions thus relinquish the 
role of a prescriptive template and become as historically conditioned as 
those of earlier theorists. This is in fact what we share, nolens volens, with 
those who have preceded us: we too attempt to understand music from a 
specific vantage point along the same historical continuum. 
*** 
A few examples may illuminate the opportunites afforded by an inter-
pretive study of the history of theory. The first takes the form of a vignette 
on the subject of Rameau and the suspension, in which an attempt will be 
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made to counteract the standard type of assumption about earlier theo-
rists made from the essentialist standpoint. Rameau's explanation of the 
suspension, taken from his first and most influential theoretical work, the 
Traite de l'Harmonie (1722), offers a clear case of an explanatory strategy 
that would never occur to us today. In the Traite, what we would deem a 
melodic suspension is for Rameau the result of the supposition (sub-posi-
tion) in the continuo bass of a supernumerary tone beneath the fundamen-
tal bass. The rule behind such a reading states that in accordance with the 
so-called senano there can be no chord which exceeds the octave; there-
fore, the existing bass note cannot be the true fundamental. And the 
assumption behind this rule is that any simultaneous combination of tones 
found in a piece of music is perforce harmonic in nature, because nature, 
in music, is harmonic. The demonstrable relation of a major triad to the 
physical properties of regularly vibrating sound makes harmony a work-
able bottom line for a Cartesian deductive process. 
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In Example 1, Rameau's notion of a supposed bass is useful in that it 
allows him to generalize about the other parts. The three upper parts of 
the chords at A, B, and C, when construed as forming a stack of three 
thirds with the fundamental bass, lbehave like the voices of a dominant 
seventh chord. Here Rameau, as a would-be deductive theorist, meets the 
challenge of showing how the apparently melodic practice of suspension 
can be harmonically generated-his explanation preserves normative fun-
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damental bass harmonic syntax (root motion by fifth). Yet even if we 
accept Rameau's explanation for chords A, B, and C, we may have more 
trouble with the chord at D, where we find what we would clearly deem a 
cadential suspension. Rameau places it in the same class as the other 
chords by supposition, stating that for reasons of undue harshness this 
particular chord omits some of its natural chord tones (G and B, the 
remaining tones of a seventh chord built on E). Since it is not divided in 
thirds like the other chords, Rameau labels the chord at D a heteroclite, 
an anomaly.lo The theoretical ~)ehavior of this chord, as an e7 progressing 
to A7, is more abstract than in cases A, B, and C-there is less evidence on 
the musical surface of the underlying seventh chord. Here we see the 
strength of Rameau's allegiance to his intellectual model: he willingly 
considers as a morphological anomaly that which in practice is an ex-
tremely common occurrence (the 4-3 cadential suspension). If we view 
his explanation from the standpoint of this allegiance, we can understand 
why he would so construe a musical phenomenon that seems to us so 
transparently otherwiseY 
In subsequent treatises Rameau appears to come closer to a melodic 
concept of suspension. In his Generation Harmonique (1737), after declar-
ing that the suspension is a dependent consequence of supposition,12 
Rameau nonetheless describes the suspension as follows: "The suspension 
consists in holding over [literally: conserving] as many harmonic tones of 
a chord as one wishes, in order to make them heard in the place of those 
which would sound in the following chord, the root of which is generally 
employed at the same time in the Basso Continuo, on condition that the 
held tones can move diatonically to those that they suspend while the root 
of these latter tones continues to sound. "13 And in the following example 
(which accompanies these passages in the treatise) Rameau remarks that 
the case at letter J must be regarded as a suspension rather than as a 
supposition.14 
Example 2. From Rameau, Generation Harmonique, ex. XXIII . 
• ll_ 
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Yet what is interesting in this example is not that Rameau finally seems 
to approach our own melodic view of a cadential suspension but that he 
felt the need at all to distinguish between supposition and suspension 
immediately after he had defined the latter as a dependent symptom of 
the former. In other words, whereas before all cases of suspension were 
explained as symptoms of supposition, it now appears that one can distin-
guish some cases as suppositions and others as suspensions. What lies 
behind this inconsistency? 
I would argue that it is indicative of a tension between the analytical 
roles of the Basso Continuo (BC) and the Basse Fondamentale (BF). 
Rameau's recognition of the suspension is really an acknowledgment that 
some musical passages are best understood in terms of the Be. In the 
Traite example, and in cases C and H of the Generation Harmonique ex-
ample, the BF allows an analysis of each passage showing it to be in 
conformance with generalized harmonic behavior. The supposed bass note 
in the BC is described as a supernumerary sound (yet related to the chord 
that follows as an anticipation). At letter ], the BC (D), according to 
Rameau's above description of the suspension, acts as the root-yet there 
is an A in the BF (which results in a root progression rare for the BF, that 
of a rising second). Rather than say that BC and BF are one here, Rameau 
says that the root is employed in the BC-while the BF hangs on as a less 
significant placeholder, a theoretical root from a different conceptual 
dimension. Thus the BC is clearly taking on an analytical role, as Rameau 
now distinguishes between cases that are best explained by the BF and 
those best explained by the BC. Suspension is a BC phenomenon, supposi-
tion a BF phenomenon. For Rameau, letting the BC determine the nature 
of the progression at] allows that progression to be understood as a 
normative dominant-to-tonic cadence with a slightly prolonged and deco-
rated dominant. ls By leaving the A in the BF, he seems to argue that while 
what is happening at] is primarily a suspension, it is still in some secondary 
sense a supposition, thus reversing his previous position. 
These equivocations mark Rameau's struggle with two different levels 
of his analytical method: an analytical bass that shows the fundamental 
derivation of the sounds on the musical surface in relation to a deductive 
system of harmony contends with an analytical bass that generates the 
simplest practical descriptions of the linear behavior of those sounds.16 
This is a central tension in Rameau, one that would be missed were we to 
comb his later work for clues to a closer propinquity to our own views 
about suspensions (and then rely on a crassly applied evolutionary model 
to support Rameau's "improving" views). The tension between BC and BF 
is the most visible manifestation of the underlying tension between musi-
cal practice and Cartesian deduction as available epistemological bases in 
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Rameau's theoretical workP In terms of intellectual history, this reading 
of Rameau links his work to an age when systematic thought tacked a 
sometimes ambiguous course between the perceived tidal forces of deduc-
tion and induction, the age of both Descartes and Newton. ls 
* * * 
Mter sketching just one symptomatic complexity of the issues Rameau 
was dealing with, it will be a bracing contrast to jump to a view of Rameau 
from the opposite end of the tonal theory spectrum, namely to Heinrich 
Schenker's version of Rameau's role in the history of theory. Here our 
emphasis is not on how a theorist engages music but how he engages the 
history of theory. An attempt to understand Schenker's fashioning of that 
history can reveal much about his own theory and its value system. At the 
same time, our discussion will mark the growing trend to address what is 
perhaps the most immediately pressing need in the history of tonal theory, 
namely, the formation of a historical perspective on Schenker.19 Such an 
approach would register as self-examination, for we still live in the Age of 
Schenker-his teachings have filtered into our daily talk about Western 
art music as pervasively and imperceptibly as those of Freud in our talk 
about human behavior. 
In his essay "Rameau oder Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben 
in der Musik?" Schenker interprets the history of theory as that of a fall 
from grace. "Before Rameau," Schenker claims, "theory and composition 
were still a unity: both exclusively embraced voice leading."20 Rameau's 
theory brought on a schism; his ill-conceived theory of harmony led to 
mechanical torpor. At the same time, however, music itself began to par-
take of spiritual life: "Suddenly an art form grew up, which, while appeal-
ing figuratively to the motions of the human soul by means of the material 
[sinnlich] living motion of the horizontal spans that are uniquely its own, 
certainly had to rank as the most autonomous and most sublime of all the 
arts."21 Echoing Riemann's primary objection to Rameau, Schenker cites 
Rameau's notion of chord structure by thirds as the scion of a misbegot-
ten race of mechanical theories of vertical chord structures. The vertical 
in music is Erstarrung, the horizontal is geistiges Leben-note the association 
Schenker makes between horizontal Ziige and the motions of the soul. 
French theory leads to death; German music is the life of the spirit. But 
Schenker's target is larger than French theory. In a strikingly Marxist 
interpretive move, Schenker relates Rameau's theory of inversion to the 
French Revolution ("Unten ist oben und oben ist unten!"), and dismisses 
both, along with the entire French Enlightenment, as evidence of 
"franzosisches MittelmaB" over and against "deutsche Genie." France's 
vaunted rationality clearly plays the serpent in Schenker's Garden of Eden, 
84 CURRENT MUSICOLOGY 
turning man away from natural genius toward a specious Tree of Knowl-
edge. 
Schenker then positions himself as a Messianic figure who will heal the 
schism and once again unite theory with art, who will bring the word of 
Genius to Man after the Fall.22 This is why he needs to view the history of 
tonal theory as a schism. His simplistic dichotomies of theory and musical 
art, mechanical chord structure and living voice leading, French medioc-
rity and German genius-they all work to the end of articulating a crisis to 
which his theory provides a synthesizing answer. Not a little of Schenker's 
fervor could be dismissed as the consolatory ravings of a failed composer 
in an age of failed composition; he is thus easily attracted to a Romantic 
notion of recovering a lost and glorious past, and of showing his citizen-
ship rights in the realm of genius. Now that theory has again become an· 
art, theorists can take up residence alongside musical genius. Schenker's 
synthesis of the schism between theory and musical art is treated as a 
creative breakthrough very much like the artistic synthesis he so admires 
in the great composers. 
But why the distasteful political framework; why is genius German, me-
diocrity French? Is this dichotomy simply a dire result of the post-World 
War I political atmosphere in Germany, or are there other factors that 
make this equation so automatic for Schenker?24 Any complete answer 
would entail nothing less than a cultural history of Germany from at least 
the eighteenth century to the twentieth. This is a history characterized by 
the interweaving of the ideas of genius, spirit, universality, and national 
identity. German intellectuals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries were in the process of building a cultural nation based on spiri-
tual affinity, a kind of spiritual Heimat whose ancestor was the Hellenic 
Golden Age. By about 1800 music became a leading metaphor for spirit, 
the cultivation of music a metaphor for spirituality. As the primary locus 
of German profundity and universality, German music was the heart of a 
spiritual nation felt to be not only universal but distinctly ethnic at the 
same time.23 Exultantly possessed by this thought, Schenker quotes these 
words of Schiller: "Every nation has its day in history, but the day of the 
Germans is the harvest of the whole. "25 
But music wasn't always the mode of this universal spirit. In the Goethezeit 
it was much more clearly the German language itself that bore that spirit-
witness the emancipation from French letters mounted in the age of 
Lessing, the subsequent translations of Shakespeare and the Persian poets, 
the agenda behind journals such as Goethe's Propyliien and the famous 
Athenaeum, and other attempts to associate German culture with the re-
vered culture of ancient Greece (culminating latterly in Heidegger's lin-
guistic speculations on the close relation between German and Greek as 
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agglutinative tongues). Germany inherited from Greece the model for its 
self-imposed role as a universal culture, or at least as the epitome of 
Western culture. 
Thus the attachment of these ideas to German nationalism is not just 
the result of post-World War I nationalist fervor, but is constitutive of 
German cultural history from at least the Deutsche Klassik, the age of Goethe 
and Schiller, Herder and Winckelmann. Perhaps the luridly emotional 
form this trend takes in Schenker's essay is engendered by the feelings of 
betrayal in Germany after the war (and by the latitude allowed such feel-
ings, even in intellectual circles), but the basic assumption of a spiritual 
homeland that is associated with German culture is in place long before 
any militaristic manifestations of nationalism (which are often deemed its 
natural consequences) and serves far different purposes. Only the close 
association of cultural spirit with German national identity could ensure 
the ease with which enemies of the state become for Schenker enemies of 
the spirit. And France, with its history of rational prowess (its tongue long 
reputed to be the very language of rational thought), makes perhaps the 
readiest antithesis to the mysteries of German spiritual profundity, myster-
ies most closely preserved in its music. 
These issues-the German question, canon formation, and spirituality 
in music-are central to the recent history of tonal theory and to our 
continued engagement with that history. The praxis that theorists such as 
Riemann and Schenker attempt to account for is fraught with valuations 
of spirit and culture that remain acutely alive and exposed in the late 
twentieth century. We as musical academics in the age of Schenker are 
fully implicated; we need to look at ourselves in just the ways that an 
interpretive study of the history of theory makes possible. We do so not to 
turn away in disgust from the tradition of the canonic masterpiece and its 
theories but to learn why we have loved this tradition, and what we can 
continue to love in it, in the manner of children who have just learned to 
see their parents as fallible humans, that is, as real historical beings rather 
than timeless entities. It is thus that we as a humanistic discipline may 
begin to grow up, take the measure of our abiding tradition, and assume 
our place, for better or worse, in the history of the Western world. 
NOTES 
1 This analogy is made more interesting by the fact that legendary figures who lose their 
shadows (or their reflections) do so as a pledge to the Devil in exchange for some sort of 
power (as in E. T. A. Hoffmann's Die Abenteuer der Silvesternacht or, more broadly, in vampire 
legends). Music thus figures, and is treated, as a powerful force that cannot be safely an-
chored in the normal world of objects, light, and shadows. Its propinquity to evil in writers as 
diverse as Plato and Thomas Mann is no coincidence. 
2 In this light, the role of philosophy as an intermediary between man and the external 
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world seems a nearer analogy to music theory than that of science, for music shares with 
philosophically conceived reality the same paradoxical combination of otherness and relat-
edness, exteriority and interiority. This is to distinguish a philosophical relation to the world 
from the largely dichotomous, subject/object relationship of science and the real world, 
defined by the ever present elements of technology and control. Philosophical assessments 
of the world are more likely to engage what it means to "be" in the world rather than what it 
means to "have" a world at one's disposal. Of course recent science has changed in this 
regard, but the science that is commonly associated with music theory is a more classical 
model. 
3 The relation of theoretical prescriptions and intellectual models in early medieval 
theory is discussed by David E. Cohen in "Metaphysics, Ideology, Discipline: Consonance and 
Dissonance in the Theory and Practice of Western Polyphony," a paper read at the Princeton 
University Music Department Colloquium on 7 May 1993. 
4 See Thomas Christensen's impressive "Science and Music Theory in the Enlighten-
ment: D'Alembert's Critique of Rameau" (Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, 1985) for a 
more in-depth view of Rameau's alleged Cartesianism. 
5 Although a dauntingly relentless and impressively thorough study, Kevin Korsyn's 
"Schenker and Kantian Epistemology," Theoria 3 (1988): 1-58, seems motivated primarily by 
the need to overturn common objections to Schenker. 
6 A brilliant example of this type of assessment is provided by Joseph Dubiel in "'When 
You Are a Beethoven': Kinds of Rules in Schenker's Counterpoint, Journal of Music Theary 34 
(1990): 291-340. Dubiel shows the central and abiding importance of the concept of the 
passing tone for Schenker's theory and does so with close readings of many examples from 
Schenker's counterpoint treatise in which he attempts to find out why Schenker sees things 
the way he does rather than instantly interpreting everything as either leading to or hinder-
ing the development of Schenker's "mature" theory. 
7 Allan Keiler, "The Origins of Schenker's Thought: How Man is Musical," Journal of 
Music Theory 33 (1989): 274. 
8 ''When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for th.e apparent absurdi-
ties in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. When you 
find an answer, ... when these passages make sense, then you may find that more central 
passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning." Tho-
mas Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), xii. 
9 I sketch a possible answer to this specific question about Riemann in "Method and 
Motivation in Hugo Riemanl).'s History of Harmonic Theory," Music Theary spectrum 14 (1992): 
9n. 
10 This is originally a Greek word meaning "inclined differently." It was used in grammars 
to denote a word of irregular declension or inflection, and from there has assumed the 
general figurative meaning of exceptional or anomalous. 
11 The reaction to RanIeau' s explanation of suspension that is precluded by a hermeneutic 
approach is exemplified in the following passage from David Beach's "The Origins of Har-
monic Analysis," Journal of Music Theary 18 (1974): 282: "Rameau's explanation of suspen-
sions reflects his conception of harmony as being separable from counterpoint. The chord, 
as isolated from its context, is considered synonymous with 'harmony'; this is a fundamental 
error in his approch to musical syntax." 
12 "La Supposition prend sa source dans l'un des Sons de la proportion Arithmetique 
ajoute au-dessous de la proportion Harmonique; la Suspension n'en est qu'une Suite." 
Generation Harmonique ou Traite de musique thiorique et pratique (Paris, 1737), 158. 
13 Ibid., 161-62. "La Suspension consiste a conserver autant de Sons Harmoniques que 
l'on veut d'un Accord, pour les faire entendre a la place de ceux qui doi~ent exister dans 
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I'Accord suivant, dont pour lors Ie Son fondamental est generalement employe dans la Basse 
continue, pourvU que ces Sons conserves puissent arriver Diatoniquement a ceux qu'ils 
suspendent, pendant que Ie Son fondamental de ces demiers existe toujours."(Translation 
mine, as are all that follow). 
14 "Le cas de J. doit etre plutat regarde comme Suspension, que comme Supposition." 
Ibid., 16l. 
15 By preferring a simpler syntactic explanation of the sounds atJ (V to I rather than II to 
V to I), Rameau could be said to be wielding Ockham's razor, an intellectual reflex (and-
significantly-an inductive reflex) which may well have justified for him the discrepancy 
between BC and BF. 
16 Just for the record, Rameau defines suspension in linear terms already in the Traite-
but he does so in Book III, the practical section of the treatise. See Treatise on Harmony, 298: 
"Chords by supposition serve only to suspend sounds which should be heard naturally .... 
This will be found wherever these chords occur, if you examine them with respect to the 
basso continuo and not to the fundamental bass, which always represents the perfect har-
mony." Here the linear view of the suspension is recognized as a strictly practical conception 
and associated explicitly with the BC, whereas the theoretical conception involves the suppo-
sition and the BF. Also notable is the implication that here the suspension is the desired 
effect, and as such is served by the supposition; in the theoretical explanation the supposi-
tion is prior and the suspension dependent. For the practicing musician, the melodic view of 
suspension is the conceptualization that is most directly conducive to playing such things 
oneself. 
17 The confusion between BC and BF in Rameau is the subject of Allan Kdler's pioneer-
ing interpretation of Rameau's fundamental bass. See Keiler, "Music as Metalanguage: 
Rameau's Fundamental Bass," in Music Theory: SPecial Topics, ed. Richmond Browne (New 
York: Academic Press, 1981), 83-100. Keiler discusses the theoretical constraints which arise 
as the result of fashioning the BF both as musical part and as metamusical paraphrase, and 
he characterizes Rameau as "the first theorist to be confronted, in the area of harmonic 
analysis, with the fact that the surface details of a piece often obscure the extent to which any 
piece conforms to the general musical language" (p. 100). 
18 For a study of Rameau reception highly sensitive to the complex pull of these currents 
in French intellectual history see Thomas Christensen, "Music Theory as Scientific Propa-
ganda: The Case of D'Alembert's EMmens de Musique," Journal of the History of Ideas 50 (1989): 
409-27. 
19 Exceptional recent work in this regard includes Allan Keiler, 'The Origins of Schenker's 
Thought," and Leslie David Blasius, "Evading Psychology: The Epistemology of Schenker's 
Kontrapunkt," a paper read at the 1989 Annual Meeting of the Society of Music Theory in 
Austin, Texas. Stephen Hinton is also at work on a forthcoming book dealing with the 
Americanization of Schenker. 
20 ''Vor dem Auftreten Rameaus waren Schaffen und Lehre eine Einheit immerhin: beide 
bekannten sich ausschlieBlich zur Stimmfiihrung." Heinrich Schenker, "Rameau oder 
Beethoven? Erstarrung oder geistiges Leben in der Musik?" Das Meisterwerk in der Musik, vol. 3 
(Munich: Drei Masken Verlag, 1930), 14. 
21 "Auf einmal wuchs eine Kunst heran, die ... mit der sinnlich-lebendigen Bewegung der ihr 
eigenen horizontalen Ziige auch die Menschenseele in ihren Bewegungen gleichnishaft ansprechend, unter 
samtlichen Kiinsten wohl als die unabhiingigste und erhabenste gelten diirfte." Ibid., 15. 
22 "Nur ein Christus konnte Tote erwecken-nur Geist allein konnte die Menschheit 
noch einmal zur Genie-Musik, dem einzig wahren Leben in Musik erwecken." Ibid., 19. 
23 In an unpublished paper entitled "On the Task of the Music Historian: The Myth of 
the Symphony after Beethoven," Sanna Pederson develops the idea of Germany as a cultural 
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nation in the context of a striking critique of Carl Dahlhaus and the myth of the symphony. 
24 The effects of World War I on Schenker's view of Rameau are discussed by Harald 
Krebs in his article, "Schenker's Changing View of Rameau: A Comparison of Remarks in 
Harmony, Counterpoint, and 'Rameau or Beethoven?' ," in Theoria 3 (1988): 69ff. 
25 'Jedes Volk hat seinen Tag in der Geschichte, doch der Tag der Deutschen ist die 
Emte der ganzen Zeit." Ibid:, 23. 
